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FEDERAL AID TO CHURCH AFFILIATED
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES:
BREACHING THE "WALL"
The vast expansion in the field of public education has been
complemented with an ever increasing growth of federal activ-
ity in this area. The impact of tremendous technological ad-
vancement and international competition has focused attention
on the educational needs of this nation. Federal aid has been
extended to assist in education by numerous measures in the
last quarter century: The National School Lunch Act of 1946,1
the National Defense Education Act of 1958,2 the National De-
fense Loan Program of 1958,8 the School Facilities Construction
Act of 1958, 4 the Higher Education Facilities Act of 19635 and
the Federal Aid to Elementary and Secondary Schools Act of
1965.6 Of the approximately 2,000 institutions of higher educa-
tion in this country, over 800 are in some degree church related9
and are allowed participation in federal funds.
The increasing use of public funds in the field of education
has, however, raised an important controversy: Is such federal
assistance to private sectarian educational institutions consti-
tutional?
I
To date, the decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the
scope of the no establishment clause of the first amendment 9
are relatively few, and there are none in point with the instant
issue. Although this is presently an open question, there are,
however, several propositions which are somewhat applicable
to the constitutional power of the federal government to provide
financial or other assistance, either direct or indirect, to secular
1. 60 Stat. 230 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1751-60 (1964).
2. 72 Stat. 1580 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 401-589 (1964).
3. 72 Stat. 1583 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 421-29 (1964).
4. 72 Stat. 548 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 631-45 (1964).
5. 77 Stat. 363 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 701-57 (1964).
6. 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 241 (a) (Supp. 1966).
7. See 109 CONG. REc. 18406 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1963).
8. Federal Prograins Under Which Institutions With Religious Affilia-
tions Receive Federal Funds Through Loans Or Grants, a memorandum pre-
pared by the legal staff of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
March 28, 1961. Nearly fifty such statutory programs are listed therein.
9. U.S. CoNsT., amend. I.
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institutions, including schools of higher education maintained
by or affiliated with religious bodies.
In this paper attention will be primarily centered on the Na-
tional Defense Loan Program10 and the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1964,1" for they are most representative of the
applicable federal legislation. The Higher Education Facilities
Act was designed to meet the need for increased academic facili-
ties in view of estimates that almost twice as many students
would seek admission to colleges in 1970 as in 1960.12 The Com-
missioner of Education is to allocate the funds to the states
according to a statutory formula. The primary responsibility
for allocating construction money is placed on the states which
are to determine the priorities of the various institutions within
their borders, although the Commission may disapprove any
state plan. The funds are to be used only for "academic facili-
ties" which are defined as structures "especially designed for
instruction or research in the natural or physical sciences, mathe-
matics, modern foreign languages, or engineering, or for use as
a library.113 "Academic facilities" are not to include any facility
to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious
worship 14 during the twenty year period of federal interest.
The National Defense Loan Program' 5 which provides funds
for students in institutions of higher learning is somewhat less
suspect due to the act's connection with national defense. Sec-
ondly, the provisions are directly of benefit to the individual
rather than to any institution.
The first amendment provides only "that Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.'
6
It is well settled that the language was to prohibit the federal
government from establishing a national religion, or from
affording any religion or religions a preferred status. 7 A large
10. 72 Stat. 1583 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 421-29 (1964).
11. 77 Stat. 363 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 701-57 (1964).
12. S. REP. No. 557, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963).
13. § 106(1), 77 Stat. 368 (1963) 20 U.S.C.A. § 176 (Supp. 1966).
14. § 401(a) (2) (c), 77 Stat. 374 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 751 (a) (2) (c) (Supp.
1966).
15. 72 Stat. 1583 (1958), 20 U.S.C. § 421-29 (1964).
16. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
17. Corwin, The SuPremne Court As National School Board, 14 LAw &
CONTEMTP. PRo. 3 (1949).
[Vol. 19
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portion of the early settlers of this country came here from Eu-
rope to escape laws which compelled their membership in, and
support of favored churches. The years preceding the coloniza-
tion of America had been filled with civil strife and persecutions,
generated in a large part by established sects determined to
maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy.
Strangely, however, these very practices of the old world were
quickly replanted in the colonies."" Several states went so far as
to provide for an official state church, 19 and in some cases re-
peated many of the old world practices and persecutions. This
situation became so commonplace that it shocked the colonials
into a feeling of abhorrence. "A resulting conviction appeared
that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a
system whereby government was stripped of all powers to tax, to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere
with the beliefs of any religious individuals or groups." 20
Perhaps the most celebrated statement concerning the first
amendment is that of Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Edu-
catiorb 1
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1946).
19. See, e.g., "the charter of the colony of Carolina which gave the grantees
the right of patronage and advowsons of all the churches and chapels ...
together with license and power to build chapels and oratories . . . and to
cause them to be dedicated and consecrated, according to the ecclesiastical
laws of the kingdom of England." PooRE, CONSTITUTIONS 1390-91 (1878).
20. Corwin, The Supreme Court As National School Board, 14 LAw &
CoNTEmP. PRoB. 3 (1949).
21. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
1967]
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establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between Church and State. 22
"The wall of separation" phrase is not one with true consti-
tutional roots; it arose from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the
Baptist Congregation of Danbury, Connecticut.23 It has, how-
ever, been sufficiently annexed to the Constitution in almost
every opinion dealing with "the establishment of religion" since
Reynolds v. United States.24 In practice the Court's "wall of
separation" has been more of a vague generality rather than a
contained area. For example, tax exemptions for religious in-
stitutions and property have been accepted in the United States
from the time the Constitution was adopted.2 5 There are a
number of other manifestations: police and fire protection to
churches, the presence of chaplains in Congress and in the
Armed Forces, "In God We Trust" as the motto inscribed on
coins, and the cry opening each session of federal court, "God
Save the United States; and this Honorable Court."26
II
A. Estaldishing the Foundation
The seeds of the present issue were perhaps sown in Pierce 'v.
Society of Sisters,27 a case which involved an Oregon statute
22. Id. at 15-16. Presidents of the United States have on several occasions
made known their thoughts. In 1875, for example, President Grant, addressing
the Grand Army of Tennessee, said:
Encourage free school and resolve that not one dollar appropriated
for their support shall be appropriated for the support of any sectarian
schools. Resolve that neither the state nor the nation, nor both com-
bined, shall support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to
afford every child growing up in the land the opportunity of a good
common school education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan or atheistical
dogmas. Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church,
and the private school, supported entirely by private contributions.
Keep the church and state forever separated. Quoted in McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 218 (1948).
23. PAmOvER, THE CoMx.=rz JErErmsoN 518-19 (1943).
24. 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
25. Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legis-
lation, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949).
26. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 255 (1947).
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
[Vol. 19
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requiring public school attendance of children between the ages
of eight and sixteen. Society of Sisters, a parochial school, and
Hill Military Academy, a private nonsectarian school, sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the statute. The Supreme Court held
that the law was invalid as an unreasonable interference with
the right of parents to control the education of their children.
The Court warned that a state cannot, consistently with the
fourteenth amendment, "standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child
is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 8
Pierce stands for the proposition that parents may, in satisfac-
tion of compulsory education laws, send their children to pri-
vate institutions, rather than to public schools, if they meet the
educational standards of the state.
Proponents of federal aid have been quick to rely on the early
cases of Bradfield v. Roberts29 and Cochran v. Louisiana Board
of Education.3" In Bradfield the Court held that federal monies
used for construction of a building on the grounds of a Roman
Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia was not a viola-
tion of the first amendment, because the primary function of the
aid was "for the cure of such sick and invalid persons as may
place themselves under the treatment of the hospital."3' 1 In
Cochran an appropriation of state tax funds to supply free text-
books for children in all schools, including sectarian schools, was
held not to violate the fourteenth amendment. The Court, quot-
ing from Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, said:
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of
purchasing school books for the use of the school children
of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their benefit
and the resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations
were made. 2
In deciding Everson v. Board of EducationA8 the Court per-
haps reached the outer limits of federal aid. This case dealt
28. Id. at 535.
29. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
30. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
31. 175 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1899).
32. 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930).
33. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
1967] NOTES
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with the use of tax funds for reimbursement of parents of
Catholic school children for transportation to and from paro-
chial schools. The Court by a five to four majority said that
the statute approached the "verge" of constitutional limits but
sustained it as public welfare legislation designed for the safety
and benefit of school age children.
Based on Coohran and Everon, it may be said that appro-
priations passed for the benefit of the public as a whole do not
violate the establishment clause even though a portion may go
to groups of a sectarian nature, if such use has only incidental
benefit to a particular religion. As Justice Black said in the
Everson case, "we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of
New Jersey against state established churches to be sure that
we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending
its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard
to their religious beliefs."
3 4
It should be recalled that Everson was the occasion for Jus-
tice Black's famed scope of the first amendment maxim "no tax
in any amount... can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions." 5
Eerson is an unreliable precedent for sustaining the federal
aid programs for several reasons. First, the result and the tenor
of discussion seem somewhat inconsistent. As Justice Jackson
pointed out in dissent, the Court could be likened to Byron's
Julia who "whispering 'I will ne'er consent,' - consented."3 6
And secondly, a major thorn in the side of sectarian aid is the
fact that the individual and not the school received the aid, a
factor significant to the majority. Thus, if the case renders pos-
sible validity to the National Defense Loans, it gives a kiss of
death to the Higher Education Facilities Act.
B. The "Release Time" Programs
MoOollum v. Board of Education 7 involved a release time
program set up by a local Illinois school board. Under the pro-
gram, public school pupils were premitted to attend classes in
religious instruction during school hours and upon school prem-
ises which were conducted by teachers representing a number of
34. Id. at 16.
35. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946).
36. 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1946).
37. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
[Vol. 19
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religious faiths. Pupils who did not attend the religious instruc-
tion sessions were required to utilize the time in studying their
regular subjects. The program was attacked on the grounds that
it violated the first and fourteenth amendments. The Supreme
Court held that the program breached the wall of separation,
and was "a utilization of the tax established and tax supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith. '8 8 The Court said that in addition to providing facili-
ties for the dissemination of religious doctrines, the state af-
forded an "invaluable aid to provide pupils for the religious
classes through the use of the state's compulsory public school
machinery."3' 9
Four years later, the Court upheld New York's release time
program in Zoracl 'v. flauson.40 The plan differed from the
one in McCol um only in that the program took place off the
school premises. The Court said, "the . . . program involves
neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor the
expenditure of public funds. All costs, including the application
blanks, are paid by the religious organization." 41
In language upholding federal aid, the Court further stated:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in
every and all respects, there shall be a separation of Church
and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of
the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion would be aliens
to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.
42
And:
[to hold otherwise] would be preferring those who be-
lieve in no religion over those who do believe. Government
may not finance religious groups, nor undertake religious
institutions, nor blend secular and sectarian education, nor
use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any
person. But we find no constitutional requirement which
38. Id. at 212.
39. Ibid.
40. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
41. Id. at 309.
42. Id. at 312.
43. Id. at 314.
1967 ]
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makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion,
and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effec-
tive scope of religious influence. The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects.43
Zorach, its critics claim, was a contest of hair-splitting an-
alysis, as was amply put by Justice Jackson in his dissent:
"[T]he distinction attempted between [McCollum] .. . and this
[case] is trivial, almost to the point of cynicism, magnifying its
nonessential details . . . the McCollum case has passed like a
storm in a teacup.1
44
Perhaps the only lesson learned from McCollum and Zorach is
that fact situations in point turn on matters of degree, a princi-
ple not uncommon in constitutional law.
C. Sunday Closing Laws
The status of McCollum was a source of much discussion
between those who interpreted Zorach to be a mere retreat and
those who found Zorach to be a repudiation. 43 As if to reaffirm
McC'ollum, or to rebuff Zorach, the Court shortly handed down
two decisions, MoGowen v. Maryland8  and Torcaso v. Wat-
klns,47 reiterating the definitive paragraph interpreting the
establishment clause as expressed in Everson and MColluum, and
making notice of the fact that the Court's opinion in Zorach
specifically stated: "We follow the McCollum case."48
At issue in the McGowen case was the constitutionality of
state legislation which, broadly speaking, required the cessation
of most commercial activities on Sunday.49 The appellants
argued that not only was the purpose of the statutes religious-
the encouragement of church attendance-but their effect was
discriminatory-preferring Sunday-worshipping Christians over
other sects.
The Court, through Chief Justice Warren, conceded that the
original purpose of Sunday closing laws was motivated by re-
44. Id. at 325.
45. See, e.g., Kouper, Church, State and Freedom, A Review, 52 MICH.
L. REV. 829 (1954): "All students of this subject may well agree that
Zorach for all practical purposes overruled McCollum."
46. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
47. 376 U.S. 488 (1961).
48. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
49. See also Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
[Vol. 19
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ligious forces but felt that today their object is to set aside a
day of rest for all citizens in an "atmosphere of recreation,
cheerfulness, repose, and enjoyment. . . . The statutes present
purpose and effect is not to aid religion .... " 50
In a separate opinion,51 Justice Frankfurter observed that the
establishment clause makes the legislature incompetent to enact
regulations, the purpose of which is to control man's religious
beliefs. "But once it is determined that a challenged statute is
supportable as implementing other substantial interests than
the promotion of belief, the guarantee prohibiting religious
'establishment' is satisfied. '52 He further stated:
If the primary end achieved by a form of regulation is
the affirmation or promotion of religious doctrine-pri-
mary, in the sense that all secular ends which it purportedly
serves are derivative from, not wholly independent of, the
advancement of religion - the regulation is beyond the
power of the state. This was the case in McCollum. Or if
a statute furthers both secular and religious ends by means
unnecessary to the effectuation of the secular ends alone-
where the same secular ends could equally be attained by
means which do not have consequences for promotion of
religion-the statute cannot stand.53
The similarity between the "B~Ze Law" cases and the issue
at hand is quite apparent. It is undisputed that education is a
secular object and one of general public concern. From the
language in McGowen it would seem that the incidental benefit
to religious groups would be outweighed by ends independent of
the advancement of religion.
D. School Prayers and Bible Reading
In Engel v. Vitale54 the Court, in another of Justice Black's
decisions, held that New York's program of daily classroom
invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in a prayer promul-
gated by its Board of Regents was a "religious activity" and use
of a public school system to encourage recitation of such prayer
50. McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 448-49 (1961).
51. Mr. Justice Harlan joined.
52. 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961).
53. Id. at 466-67.
54. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19671
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was a practice wholly inconsistent with the establishment of
religion clause.
Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion made note of Justice
Rutledge's dissent in Everson:
Now as when it was adopted the price of religious free-
dom is double. It is that the church and religion shall live
both within and upon that freedom. There cannot be free-
dom of religion, safeguarded by the state, and intervention
by the church or its agencies in the state's domain or de-
pending on its largesse. The great condition of religious
liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also
from other interferences, by the state. For when it comes
to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the
resting. Publlc money devoted to payment of religious costs,
educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings
too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or
for any. Here one by numbers alone will benefit most, there
another. That is precisely the history of societies which
have had an established religion and dissident groups.55
Although perhaps tempered somewhat by Douglas' prior ref-
erences to neutrality, the above is nevertheless harrowing to the
proponents of aid programs. Note especially the language of the
Higher Education Facilities Act dealing with the administra-
tion of funds by state officials.55
The Bible Reading cases, Abington School District v.
&hempp, and Murray v. Curlett,57 involved a Pennsylvania
statute and a Maryland regulation which required the reading
of a portion of the Holy Bible without comment and the recita-
tion of the Lord's Prayer at the opening of each day of public
school. It was provided that any child could be excused from
participation upon parent's request.
In declaring these practices to be violative of the establish-
ment clause, the Court found that their primary effect was the
advancement of religious beliefs. Writing for the majority,
Justice Clark shed some light on the neutrality requirement of
the first amendment, 58 rejecting "unequivocally the contention
55. Id. at 444.
56. § 106(1), 77 Stat. 374 (1963), 20 U.S.C.A. § 751(a) (2) (c) (Supp.
1966).
57. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (companion cases).
58. See, e.g., Konvitz, Separation of Church and State; The First Freedom,
14 LAW AND CoN'raZiP. PRoB. 44 (1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as
National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949).
[Vol. 19
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that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental pref-
erence of one religion over another." 9-
The true meaning of the neutrality principle can be found in
the interaction of the first amendment's twin religious clauses.
Justice Clark explained it in terms of a specific test:
The test may be stated as follows: What are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the struc-
tures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.60
There is at least one major factor which distinguishes the aid
and assistance proscribed in Zorach, MACollum, Engel and
Schempp from that to be rendered under the federal aid to edu-
cation programs. The former involved state approval and sup-
port of religion over nonbelief while the federal legislation
expresses neither approval nor disapproval. To be sure, direct
financial aid does serve to encourage religious education, but it
cannot be doubted that the primary scheme is neutral between
religion and nonbeZief since its benefits are available to state
and nondenominational schools as well as sectarian institutions.
Such neutrality is an important distinguishing factor in light
of Everson v. Board of Education,6 and Cohran v. Louisiana
Board of Education.62
Attention should also be given to Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion in Schempp-Murray:
The most effective way to establish any institution is to
finance it, and this truth is reflected in the appeals by
church groups for public funds to finance their religious
schools. Financing a church either in its strictly religious
activities or in its other activities is equally unconstitutional,
as I understand the establishment clause. Budgets for one
activity may be technically separable from budgets for
others. But the institution is an inseparable whole, a living
59. 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
60. Id. at 222.
61. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
62. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
1967] NoTes
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organism, which is strengthened in proselytizing when it is
strengthened in any department by contributions from other
than its own members.63
Such language would certainly preclude all forms of general
grants and assistance to church affiliated schools and would
probably find the Higher Education Facilities Act equally
offensive. For example, grants for construction of a science or
engineering building, certainly secular, would allow sectarian
funds to be freed from that purpose and possibly be used for
a chapel, clearly a religious end.64
E. Sherbert v. Verner
The appellant in Sherbert v. Venter,65 a Seventh-day Ad-
ventist, had been discharged from her employment because she
would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. She
was subsequently declared ineligible for unemployment com-
pensation, because she refused to accept employment involving
work on Saturday."6
In holding the unemployment compensation act unconstitu-
tional as applied to the appellant, the Court found that the ap-
pellant's disqualification for unemployment compensation im-
posed an indirect burden on the free exercise of her religion.
She was forced to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting the unemployment benefits and abandon-
ing one of her religious principles in order to qualify.
In dissenting, Justices Harlan and White pointed out that the
majority implied that if a statute of general application imposes
an indirect financial burden upon a person or group solely be-
cause of religiously motivated conduct, the government is com-
pelled by the free exercise clause to create an exception, unless
compelling state interests require otherwise.
Accepting this, is it not at least arguable that to deny indi-
viduals desiring to attend religious affiliated schools the bene-
fits of federal aid that their contemporaries in private schools
enjoy would penalize them because of their religious beliefs?
63. 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963).
64. Construction at places of worship are prohibited by the Higher Educa-
tion Facilities Act, § 401(a) (2) (c), 77 Stat. 374 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 751
(a) (2) (c) (1964).
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66. Unemployment Compensation Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114 (1952) de-
clared ineligible for its benefits a claimant "who has failed, without good
cause ... to accept suitable work when offered him. .. ."
[Vol. 19
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F. Horace Mann League and Maryland Education Cases
The only case decided subsequent to Engel and Sohempp
involving the establishment clause is Horace Mann League of
the United States v. Board of PubZic Works.6 The Maryland
Court of Appeals used federal constitutional principles 8 to
determine whether state aid to sectarian schools was violative
of the first amendment. It laid down several factors as signifi-
cant in determining whether an educational institution is re-
ligious or secular:
(1) The stated purposes of the college.
(2) The college personnel, which includes the governing
board, the administrative officers, the faculty, and the stu-
dent body. With considerable stress being laid on the sub-
stantiality of religious control over the governing board as
criterion of whether a college is sectarian.
(3) The college's relationship with religious organiza-
tions and groups, which relationship includes the extent of
ownership, financial assistance, the college's memberships
and affiliations, religious purposes, and miscellaneous rela-
tionship with its sponsoring church.
(4) The place of religion in the college's program, which
includes the extent of religious manifestation in the physi-
cal surroundings, the character and extent of religious ob-
servance sponsored or encouraged by the college, the re-
quired participation for any or all students, the extent to
which the college sponsors or encourages religious activity
of sects different from that of the college's own church, and
the place of religion in the curriculum and in extracurricu-
lar programs.
(5) Result or "outcome" of the college program, such as
accreditation, and the nature and character of the activities
of the alumni.
(6) The work and image of the college in the com-
munity.
69
67. 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 317 (1966).
68. First amendment freedoms, made applicable to the states in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
69. 242 Md. 645, , 220 A2d 51, 65-66 (1966).
19671 NoT
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By way of summary of past guidelines the Maryland Court said:
No tax, in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religions .... Although a state cannot con-
tribute tax-received funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church, it cannot
exclude individuals, because of their faith or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of valid public welfare legisla-
tion.70
Of the four schools involved-Hood College, Western Mary-
land, Notre Dame, and St. Joseph-only Hood College was
found to be so removed from church connection that aid would
not constitute an establishment of religion.
Hood College differed in that the college's relation with the
United Church of Christ and its "stated purposes in relation to
religion are not of fervent, intense, or passionate nature, but
seem to be based largely upon its historical background."'7
Rmphasis was placed on findings that financial assistance given
by the church amounted to only 2.2%, and that religion did not
occupy a dominant place in the Hood program.
On examination of Notre Dame and St. Joseph the Court
found that the entire "atmosphere of the College was permeated,
motivated, enlarged, and integrated by the Catholic way of
life.117,
At Western Maryland College, while only 3% of the budget
was provided by the Methodist Church, considerable importance
seemed to be placed on the fact that participation in Protestant
religious services was required of all students. Further examina-
tion showed that of the Hood College student body of 675
only 89 were members of the United Church of Christ. Western
Maryland had a 40% Methodist student body, and Notre Dame
and St. Jospeh had a student body of 97% Catholic.
The above case is significant for several reasons. First, as
previously noted, the Maryland case somewhat defines the scope
of EngeZ and Schernpp. Second, the instant case introduces a
possible alternative argument for supporters of federal aid, that
70. Id. at 64-65.
71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. at 70.
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being, no "sufficient connection with a sponsoring sect to violate
the no establishment clause."
G. GonstitutioaZw Source
The structure of the legislation in question illuminates several
possible grounds to support its constitutionality.7 It is generally
accepted, as evident in the Loan Programs and in the committee
records of the Higher Education Facilities Act,74 that national
defense is of sufficient justification for the assistance. But
national defense is not the only source of justification for the
exercise of federal power. One may also find its source in the
national welfare, in the war powers, in the commerce power,
or the power to tax. Any of these powers, with or without
the broad scope of the "necessary and proper" clause, would
possibly be sufficient. But because these powers are given
in rather broad language, a possible resulting conflict with the
first amendment arises. Faced with this situation, the Court
may say that the establishment clause is one of "preferred
nature." 5 Thus, the establishment clause would be a limitation
applicable to any or all of these powers. In other words, the
federal government cannot exercise any power in a way which
is inconsistent with the first amendment. 76 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has on several occasions permitted certain
interest, such as national security, to outweigh other first amend-
ment rights, as exemplified in Dennis v. United States." This
"balance approach" may be quite relevant in light of Sherbert
v. Yerner7 s where the court applied a balancing approach with
respect to the "free exercise clause" in the first amendment.
Assuming that the legislation at issue is primarily secular in
nature and of incidental benefit to particular religious bodies,
survival might well depend on the Court's employing a balancing
test between the prohibitions of the establishment clause and the
public benefit to be gained from a better educated population.
73. Manning, Aid to Education--Federal Fashion, 29 FomnAm L. REv. 495
(1961).
74. 109 CoNG. Rmc. 18255 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1963).
75. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
76. Manning, Aid to Education--Federal Fashion, 29 FoRDHAm L. IEv. 495
(1961).
77. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
78. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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H. Standing
An added problem.to be considered is that of standing-re-
garding what parties could successfully challenge the constitu-
tionality of such federal statutes. In Frothingham v. Melon79
the Court declared that an individual taxpayer, without more,
does not have standing to bring a suit to restrain the enforce-
ment of an act of Congress authorizing appropriations of pub-
lic money upon the ground that the act is unconstitutional. A
suit challenging appropriations from the federal treasury is not
a "judicial controversy" within the meaning of Article III of
the Constitution.80
Theoretical justification for this refusal to entertain federal
taxpayer suits is that the judicial branch is not competent to
adjudicate alleged wrongs which do not impinge directly on the
individual but which he suffers merely in an indefinite way and
in common with the people in general.81 It may be noted that
numerous taxpayer suits have been brought in state courts to
test the constitutionality of state aid to religious schools.
8 2
However, it appears that Frothinghan would preclude any
constitutional attack by an individual.
In Massachusetts v. MeZlon,83 the companion case to Froth-
ingham, the state sought to attack the constitutionality of the
Maternity Act,84 which provided appropriation to the several
states to assist in the reduction of maternal and infant mortality
which its citizens had been unable to do. In denying the state
standing to attack, it was pointed out that the statute imposes
no obligation but simply extends an option which the state is
free to accept or reject.85 It was further stated that it is not the
duty of the state to protect its citizens who are also citizens of
the United States from the operation of a statute of the United
States, since with respect to their relations with the federal
79. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
80. U.S. CoNsr. art III, § 2.
81. 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
82. Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d
51, cert. denied, 87 S. Ct 317 (1966) ; Abernathy v. City of Irvine, 335 S.W.2d
159 (Ky. 1961); Dickmon v. School Dist. No. 62C, 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d
533 (1961); Swat v. South Burlington Town School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167
A.2d 514, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1963).
83. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
84. 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
85. 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
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government, it is the latter's function to serve as parens
patriae.
8
It is therefore suggested that an attack by private or state
supported schools with or without the assistance of their respec-
tive state, while skipping around Frothingham, would collide
with the principle of Massacusetts v. Mellon.
MI
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this examination
is that the constitutionality of federal aid to religious affiliated
colleges and universities remains an open question, there being
sufficient justification to reject or uphold the constitutionality
of such legislation. There being no true precedent, the inter-
pretation of the establishment clause depends on one's view of
the first amendment. If the establishment clause demands an
absolute separation of the activities of government and the in-
terests of religious denominations, then, to be sure, federal
assistance to sectarian schools could not exist. Such an approach
is neither realistic or possible for it assumes that state and re-
ligion co-exist in mutually exclusive and self-contained spheres.
As previously pointed out, there are presently any number of
examples of church-state cooperations which preclude the
existence of this approach.
It cannot be doubted that education is a traditional and legiti-
mate governmental interest and evidences a secular purpose
which should be sufficient to meet constitutional objections. If
there is a conflict with the objectives of the first amendment,
it would be only from some incidental benefit.
The Court has made quite clear that in its relations with
religious bodies, the concept of the first amendment requires
neutrality. The scheme of the legislation at issue seemingly
satisfies this requirement. There is no requirement of govern-
mental approval and support of a particular religion, or re-
ligions over nonbelief because aid is equally provided to all
institutions of higher education regardless of religious affilia-
tion. As in George Orwell's aphorism "All animals are equal,
but some animals are more equal than others,"87 to deny assist-
ance to institutions because of affiliation would be to make the
86. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
87. ORWELT, ANmiAL FAPm (1945). Analogy suggested in Aid to Education
-Federal Fashion, 29 FoRDHAia L. Ray. 495 (1961).
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unreligious animal more equal than the religious animal. Cer-
tainly there can be no constitutional requirement for the above.
Even assuming that federal assistance in this area violates
the establishment clause, it is quite doubtful in light of the
Mellon case that one could ever successfully challenge the con-
stitutionality of such enactments. Such an argument takes on
added persuasiveness by looking at the cases involving the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority."8 While they in no way relate to the
issue involved here, nevertheless, they involved a great national
need as opposed to private property rights and a resulting lack
of standing.
To deny federal assistance to all sectarian schools, whose affil-
iation with a religious body is in many cases no more than lip
service, while allowing increasing amounts of aid to private and
state institutions, would be to place the former out of the com-
petitive market by prohibitive cost to students. Such is highly
unlikely at a time when increased enrollments have resulted in
already overcrowded conditions.
H. SPENOR KING
88. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama
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